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Abstract: Awareness of the specific need for solving problems of jurisdiction
and finance in Indian litigation, a growing feeling that Indian claims should re-
ceive more speedy and just attention, and administrative expedience combined
to cause Congress to adopt the Indian Claims Commission Act in 1942 and to
extend it ten years later to 1962. The author describes the types of claims that
arise and discusses some of the issues involved with special reference to the role
of expert testimony by anthropologists, whose views have been sought in order
to clarify such matters as the identification of tribes and the original boundaries
of their lands.&mdash;Ed.
THE Indian Claims Commission Actembodies a number of remarkable
legal features as a reflection of problems
that have arisen in dealings between the
United States and the various Indian
tribes. The actual prosecution of suits
in accordance with the terms of the Act
has led in turn to certain interpretations
and procedural aspects of special inter-
est to social scientists. The following
discussion will consider these historical
and recent phases in the development
and application of the Indian Claims
Commission Act.’ .
The Act, approved August 13, 1946,
was to remain in effect for ten years;
all claims had to be filed within five
years from the date of approval. Due to
the large number of cases that had not
yet been heard or adjudicated by 1956,
the Act was extended in all its details
until April 10, 1962.z 2 The Commission
is presided over by a chief commissioner
and two associate commissioners; Indian
petitioners are represented by private at-
torneys ; and the United States is de-
fended against Indian claims by attor-
neys of the Department of Justice. The
Commission has promulgated rules of
procedure, but the rules of evidence ap-
plicable are comparable to any federal
court.
The Act creating the Indian Claims
Commission is of relatively recent date,
but the need for such legislation had
long been recognized for a variety of
reasons. Primary among these was the
problem of defining jurisdiction in In-
dian litigation. Although the United
States Court of Claims was established
in 1855 to permit suit to be brought
against the government, by 1863 tribal
claims based on treaties were excluded
from the general jurisdiction of the
1 It must be noted that many of the claims
discussed are still pending. Thus, my analy-
ses, apart from specific points duly cited, are
my own views based on personal observation,
experience, and research as an expert witness
and are not to be construed as the views of
the Indian tribes or attorneys by whom I
have been employed. While maintaining my
personal responsibility for this article, I would
like to thank the many colleagues whose
stimulating discussions of a variety of Indian
claims have suggested factual and theoretical
insights. I would particularly like to thank
Dr. Angie Debo who had begun research for
this study and graciously forwarded her notes
for my use.
2 C. 949, 60 Stat. 1049; 25 U.S.C. 70; P.L.
767, Eighty-fourth Congress, Second Session.
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court.3 3 Like foreign nations, it was
necessary for each tribe to obtain a
special jurisdictional act from Congress
in order to present its case in the United
States Court of Claims. This arrange-
ment was discriminatory in that tribes
differed in the amount of political influ-
ence they could command and in having
effective legislative spokesmen for their
cases. It was also an expensive and
time-consuming procedure, since each
claim required a virtual trial in Con-
gress whereby cause for granting a spe-
cial act might be demonstrated. If such
an act were granted, the provisions al-
lowed the tribe as a basis of suit were
frequently construed in such a narrow
way that it was difficult to obtain a full
consideration of tribal grievances in the
Court of Claims. The result was that
a majority of petitions was dismissed by
the court.
PROBLEMS OF JURISDICTION AND
FINANCE IN LITIGATIONS
A tabulation covering the years 1881-
1950 revealed that of 118 claims pre-
sented by Indian tribes before the Court
of Claims, only thirty-four were allowed
recovery.4 Lawyers were understand-
ably reluctant to represent Indian cli-
ents in light of the highly spcialized na-
ture of the litigation and the small like-
lihood of recovery. Furthermore, many
attorneys recognized that Indian griev-
ances often arose out of concepts of a
cultural and social nature not covered
by customary interpretations of Ameri-
can law, but that these grievances de-
served special recognition. For exam-
ple, the Winnebago case, Docket No.
M-421 in the Court of Claims, was be-
gun in 1928 and finally dismissed in
1942. This time lag as well as the
negative outcome was typical of a cate-
gory of cases connected with the re-
moval of tribes from one place to an-
other.
The tribe claimed restitution on the
basis that they had been removed from
a reservation in Minnesota to one in
South Dakota without their consent.
The consequent hardships involving the
death of many Winnebago by starvation
and exposure forced the rest to flee from
South Dakota if they hoped to survive.
Ultimately, a majority of these Indians
settled among the Omaha where their
present reservation was granted to them.
Their efforts to become acculturated in
Minnesota had been interrupted, many
of their older leaders had died in the re-
moval, and their social and cultural life
was disrupted and disorganized by the
shift in reservations. Although the char-
acterization of the gavernment as &dquo;gen-
erous&dquo; in the final dismissal of the case
may sound ironic, it was proper in legal
terms. The’Court of Claims measured
cause for recovery in regard to compa-
rable land values, and the last reserva-
tion in question was equal to the first
reservation, if not exceeding it in value.
The fact that the Winnebago for many
years actually resided in the small tim-
bered area of the reservation, being un-
able to utilize the agricultural lands
placed at their disposal in Nebraska,
was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
Likewise, the loss of the agricultural
land through the machinations of vari-
3 Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 765.
4 "Tabulation Showing Highly Speculative
Nature of Indian Tribal Suits," Court of
Claims Nos. 45585, 46640, 47564, 47566; affi-
davit of Ernest L. Wilkinson Respecting in
The Above Captioned Cases, pp. ii, appendix
2, 3. This information was compiled in con-
nection with the celebrated claim of the Ute
Indians of Colorado which resulted in a com-
promise judgment of just over $31,000,000.
It was the largest award ever made in an In-
dian claim and larger than the total of all
other awards made in Indian claims in the
Court of Claims. Despite these spectacular
aspects, it was typical of Indian litigation in
other respects. The attorneys’ fees were set
at less than 9 per cent of the final judgment,
and the case covered eighteen years from the
time contracts were signed until the final
amount was settled (1932-1950).
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ous white people could not be consid-
ered in the case. Situations of this na-
ture illustrated that the real causes of
Indian complaints were not being met
in the Court of Claims.
Apart from the problem of jurisdic-
tion was the matter of claims which
were never pressed although they might
have stood a good chance of recovery in
the Court of Claims. These were the
cases of tribes which had inadequate
funds or no funds at all with which to
prepare and prosecute their cases.
Along with the awareness of the spe-
cific need to solve the questions of juris-
diction and finance in Indian litigation,
there gradually developed a public senti-
ment that justice was due the Indians
which required attention. However, this
component of conscience which led to
the eventual passage of the Indian
Claims Commission Act was under-
scored by two matters of administra-
tive expediency. First, notwithstanding
the discouraging statistics in regard to
recovery in Indian claims, as Indians
became increasingly cognizant of their
rights before the law, Congress was pe-
titioned with ever greater frequency for
special jurisdictional acts. These cases
exhibited certain common features that
suggested the possibility of creating some
general jurisdictional legislation, thereby
saving time and money for both the
government and the Indians.
Second, the unsettled claims were rec-
ognized as contributing to the difficul-
ties attendant on the over-all adminis-
tration of Indian affairs. As early as
1928 the situation was summarized suc-
cinctly in a special report dealing with
Indian problems:
The benevolent desire of the United States
government to educate and civilize the In-
dians cannot be realized with a tribe which
has any considerable unsatisfied bona fide
claim against the government. The expec-
tation of large awards making all members
of the tribe wealthy, the disturbing influ-
ence of outside agitators seeking personal
emoluments, and the conviction in the In-
dian mind that justice is being denied, ren-
ders extremely difficult any cooperation be-
tween the government and its Indian wards.
Besides these practical considerations, the
simple canons of justice and morality de-
mand that no Indian tribe should be denied
the opportunity to present for adjustment
before an appropriate tribunal the rights
which the tribe claims under recognized
principles of law and government. 1B
The insistence in the above report
that legal steps of a judicial nature be
taken points up another category of In-
dian claims besides those which could
be dealt with in the Court of Claims if
jurisdiction were granted by Congress.
Cases in which Congress might grant
direct relief will be given special con-
sideration in the discussion of jurisdic-
tional provisions in the Indian Claims
Commission Act. It may be noted here,
however, that such claims relied even
more heavily on the caprice of Congress
than did claims arising out of treaties.
FEATURES OF INDIAN CLAIMS
COMMISSION ACT
As a result of the attempt to deal
with the sundry issues raised in Indian
litigation, the Indian Claims Commis-
sion Act contains several features unique
in the history of American jurispru-
dence. It is important to study the
Act in detail at this point since the in-
terpretations and regularizations of pro-
cedure, which have grown out of the ap-
plication of the law, are often mistaken
for the law itself. Curiously, the gen-
eral results of cases to date have tended
toward a conservative interpretation of
the substantive aspects. The procedure
in the presentation of evidence and the
evidence itself have taken a course that
5 Lewis Meriam and Associates, The Prob-
lem of Indian Administration (Baltimore: In-
stitute for Government Research, 1928), p.
805.
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was not within the scope of prediction
or expectation of those responsible for
the Act.
Apparently, the feature dealt with
most easily was the financing of Indian
cases. Section 15 of the Act sets forth
in detail the arrangements regarding
legal representation. Special reference
to fees for Indians’ attorneys points up
two unusual matters. Where tribes are
unable to invest in any expenses of liti-
gation, and this is the usual situation,
cases may be conducted on an entirely
contingent basis. This provision is at
sharp variance with ordinary regulations
of legal practice. An attorney taking a
case of this type risks losing his entire
investment. Furthermore, any attorney
winning a judgment in favor of his cli-
ents may receive no more than 10 per
cent of the net judgment, aside from
actual expenses incurred in the prosecu-
tion of the case. It should be noted
that claims which do not involve In-
dians may result in attorneys’ fees cov-
ering as much as 25 to 50 per cent of
the final award. Despite these stringent
regulations, Indians have apparently ex-
perienced little difficulty in finding at-
torneys to take their cases. This may
be attributed in part to the huge land
areas involved--conceivably the entire
United States and a large portion of
Alaska-so that even 10 per cent of a
judgment appeared to be a sizable sum
worth an attorney’s efforts.0
Once cases began to be heard, the
wording of the Act required interpreta-
tion, and, as a consequence, attention
has centered on four primary problems.
These are the identity of the petitioners,
the grounds for suit, the presentation of
specialized evidence, and the assessment
of land values. The matter of evidence
must be considered at the outset since it
relates to the other problems. Section 13
(b) also of the Act states that the Com-
mission shall establish an &dquo;Investigation
Division&dquo; to search for evidence in the
documents and records of the Court of
Claims and the several government de-
partments. Such information is to be
submitted to the Commission and also
to be made available to the Indians
involved and to any interested federal
agency. The division has never been
established, presumably because it was
not considered necessary, and funds were
never allocated for this purpose. Sec-
tion 13 (b) provides for the taking of
depositions from aged Indians and other
individuals having direct knowledge of
claims to be presented.
However, it soon became obvious that
evidence would consist of more than offi-
cial documents or records and direct
testimony of Indians or their neighbors.
Such evidence required organization and
interpretation by experts skilled in work
of this type. Consequently, anthropo-
logical and historical analyses began to
play an important part in claims litiga-
tion. Critical study of literature con-
cerning given tribes was buttressed with
ethnographic accounts. These offered
more complete information and more ac-
curate descriptions than the direct testi-
mony of Indians taken according to the
format of legal depositions. Archeologi-
cal investigations provided information
where documentary and ethnographic
information was incomplete. Even the
6 Mention should also be made of those at-
torneys who for many years had been con-
cerned about the discriminatory and compli-
cated aspects involved in Indian claims cases.
They greeted the Indian Claims Commission
Act as a long needed legal measure and were
ready to represent Indian clients under its pro-
visions. No history of the Indian Claims
Commission Act is complete without reference
to the instrumental role of two attorneys.
Ernest L. Wilkinson, as noted in note 4 above,
was able to supply a full understanding of the
difficulties to be overcome in dealing with In-
dian litigation, while the late Felix Cohen, As-
sistant Solicitor in the Department of the In-
terior at the time the Act was passed, con-
cerned himself deeply with its provisions as a
matter of federal duty.
60
assessment of land values required a
background of historical understanding.
Again, the Act makes no specific men-
tion of anthropological or historical ex-
pertise, but the provisions of Section 18
regarding testimony and the Commis-
sion’s rules of procedure are sufficiently
broad to admit such testitnony.7 7
ANTHROPOLOGICAL TESTIMONY
The Court of Claims had used anthro-
pological testimony on only three occa-
sions and no precedents in testimony
had been established in this regard, so
that the role of expert witness was a
new one for archeologists, ethnologists,
and ethnohistorians. When differing
theoretical positions, analyses, and ter-
minology began to loom significantly in
the final outcome of the cases, anthro-
pologists became upset and took little
comfort from attorneys’ assurances that
even mathematicians and engineers dif-
fered in their expert testimony. Many
anthropologists have suggested that the
investigation division be activated and
that it provide for the inclusion of testi-
mony by anthropological consultants to
deal with specialized information and
interpretations. It has also been sug-
gested that pretrial discussions be per-
mitted between experts who felt that the
differences in their testimony were more
apparent than real and was due to the
nature of questions put to them in a
litigious situation. However, to date,
standard legal procedure has been fol-
lowed with both the Department of Jus-
tice and the Indians’ attorneys examin-
ing their own experts and cross-exam-
ining their opponents’ witnesses. The
special problems usually considered by
these witnesses then concern matters of
Indian identity and grounds for suit.
Land values, which enter later into the
proceedings, have been the special prov-
ince of land assessors and historians and
will be discussed in another connection.
Turning to the question of identity,
Section 2 of the Act sets forth a de-
scription of the petitioners which is in-
tended to include all likely claimants
within the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion : &dquo;any tribe, band, or other identi-
fiable group of American Indians resid-
ing within the territorial limits of the
United States or Alaska.&dquo; Due to the
reliance on anthropologists, these terms
have given rise to unexpected semantic
complications. One scholar’s tribe is an-
other scholar’s band; some writers have
used the terms synonymously; other an-
thropologists distinguish different types
of tribes and bands depending on their
historic origins. Thus, in the case of
the Lower or Idaho Kootenai, the social
identity of this populational entity was
an initial point at issue. Docket 154
before the Indian Claims Commission
describes the petitioner as the &dquo;Kootenai
Tribe or Band of Indians of the State
of Idaho,&dquo; which is an admissible dual
designation employed by attorneys to
deal with the equivocal wording of the
Act. Nevertheless, it was argued by the
defense that perhaps the Idaho Koote-
nai had no right to bring a separate suit
as a distinct social entity since the Koo-
tenai in Docket 61 were already bring-
ing suit in the claim of the &dquo;Confeder-
ated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the
Flathead Reservation, Montana.&dquo; The
similarity of names, and the fact that
the area claimed was included in the
treaty map which was the basis of the
Montana tribes’ claim, suggested that
the Idaho Kootenai were but a geo-
graphic subdivision of a single Kootenai
tribe. The Montana Kootenai recog-
nized the separate tribal identity of the
Idaho Kootenai and stipulated to that
effect.
7 Donald C. Gormley, "The Role of the Ex-
pert Witness," Enthnohistory, Vol. 2, No. 4
(1955), pp. 326-46, discusses expertise gener-
ally and with special reference to anthropo-
logical testimony in connection with the In-
dian Claims Commission Act.
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Documentary evidence along with
ethnographic information indicated that
only the historic accident of linguistic
similarity accounted for the designation
of the two tribes as &dquo;Upper Kootenai&dquo;
and &dquo;Lower Kootenai&dquo; in a largely
Salish-speaking area. Earlier literature
indicated that completely different names
were used for each tribe. The Idaho
Kootenai had not only been absent from
the treaty negotiations of 1855, but for
many years were unaware that their
lands had been included within the ces-
sion boundaries. Although specific defi-
nitions of groups must thus be adduced
in each case on the basis of distinctive
customs, genealogies, locations and the
like, the question of a general definition
is repeated over and over by attorneys
for the petitioners and for the defense:
&dquo;Now, Doctor, how would you define
the word tribe? ... In your opinion,
do the petitioner Indians conform to
this definition?&dquo;
DEFINITIONS OF INDIAN SOCIAL
ENTITIES
The phrase &dquo;identifiable group of
American Indians&dquo; appeals to anthro-
pologists as having general utility in dis-
tinguishing a cohesive and recognizable
social entity whereby the varied and
special connotations of tribe and band
might be bypassed. Unfortunately, this
term has also been construed in differ-
ent ways. It may have an ethnological
and historical basis like tribes or bands.
It may also have a legal basis in terms
of groups derived as treaty entities or
in terms of &dquo;statutory groups&dquo; created
by Congress for administrative expedi-
ency, such as &dquo;The Indians of Cali-
fornia.&dquo;
The problem of identity goes deeper
than simply defining a society, but im-
plies factors of time and socio-cultural
continuity. It is necessary to estab-
lish the historic relationship of Indians
bringing suit as the rightful heirs to
recovery for claims originating one or
more generations in the past. In a ma-
jority of cases the claims refer to a
period from which there are no living
survivors. Section 2 provides that all
defenses except laches and statutes of
limitations may be used by the United
States, so that the time covered between
the origin of a claim and the hearing
regarding it may be a century or longer.
The complications arising in these in-
stances are many and varied. A fre-
quent historic accident was the geo-
graphic separation of what was once a
single tribe, holding a common territory,
into several smaller groups. Such is the
case of the Sac and Fox, Ioway, Pota-
watomi, Winnebago, and many others.
Another common situation is that of
several tribes who signed a joint treaty
and were located on a single reserva-
tion. These tribes now have a general
tribal council which does not represent
the component tribes. Thus, their sepa-
rate histories must be disentangled, as
in the cases of the Confederated Salish
and Kootenai tribes already mentioned,
the Confederated tribes of the Colville
reservation, the Three Affiliated Tribes
of the Fort Berthold reservation, and
others.&dquo;
8 To the layman, the identity of petitioners’
legal representatives becomes almost as com-
plex as the identity of the petitioners them-
selves. According to section 10 of the Act,
tribal organizations authorized by the Secre-
tary of the Interior have the exclusive right to
bring claims in behalf of their tribes. Where
there is no such council, any member may
bring a claim in behalf of his tribe. In some
tribes different factions have retained different
firms of attorneys who have had to make
common cause in the Indians’ interests. Some-
times a tribe has been divided into separate
geographical enclaves, each having a council
and its own attorneys who work together in
bringing suit in a claim common to all of the
branches of the tribes. Several firms may
share the burden of preparing contingent cases
with the understanding that all will share to
an appropriate amount in any judgment which
may be awarded.
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On the Northwest coast another type
of confusion may be seen in the fact
that in the 1850’s the treaty commis-
sioners were directed to combine little
tribes into big tribes and locate as many
as possible on single reservations. The
Quileute of the Olympic Peninsula offer
an example of this situation. These
people lived at the mouth of the Quile-
ute River and in a few villages located
further upstream. The question arose as
to whether the various villages brought
together on a single Quileute reservation
represented separate little tribes which
ought each to bring suit, or whether all
formed an original tribe. There seemed
to be little question, at least in the
minds of the petitioner Indians and
their attorneys, that all of the people
on the Quileute River belonged to one
tribe as indicated by genealogies and
other cultural data. However, other
villages located on the neighboring Hoh
River also spoke Quileute and seemed
to be part of the same tribe on the basis
of kinship and common customs. They
had been reluctant to move to the
Quileute reservation and were eventu-
ally given a tiny reservation on the Hoh
River. Since the claim embraced the
watersheds of the Hoh and Quileute
Rivers as one large tract, the identity
of the petitioners was assured in Docket
155 with the complicated designation
of: &dquo;The Quileute Tribe of Indians, on
its own behalf, Quileute Tribe of In-
dians, on its own behalf and on behalf
of the Hoh Tribe or Band of Indians;
Hoh Tribe or Band of Indians, on the
relation of and represented by Scott
Fisher, on its own Behalf.&dquo;
In other cases the attempt at con-
solidation of claims as a single tribe has
been unsuccessful. A number of Chip-
pewa brought a common suit as the
Chippewa nation since they had been so
designated in various treaties. When
the claim, Docket No. 126, was first
brought to the Court of Claims, the
Chippewa nation was directed to reduce
the matter into the separate claims of
the component bands of the Chippewa
nation. Chippewa claims later heard by
the Commission were likewise set forth
on the basis of separate bands. The
Commission took a similar view con-
cerning the Ottawa Case, Docket No. 2,
where the Ottawa were interpreted as
comprising several bands notwithstand-
ing treaty terminology concerning the
Ottawa nation.
CLAIMS CATEGORIES
Similar to the difficulties raised in the
latitude of jurisdiction in the descrip-
tion of petitioners are those involved in
the broad grounds for claims. The five
categories of claims as set forth in Sec-
tion 2 of the Indian Claims Commission
Act will be discussed in the order given.
(1) Claims in law or equity arising un-
der the Constitution, laws, treaties of the
United States and Executive Orders of the
President; (2) all other claims in law or
equity, including those sounding in tort,
with respect to which the claimant would
be entitled to sue in a court of the United
States if the United States was subject to
suit; (3) claims which would result if the
treaties, contracts, and agreements between
the United States were revised on the
ground of fraud, duress, unconscionable
consideration, mutual or unilateral mistake,
whether of law or fact, or any other ground
cognizable by a court of equity; (4) claims
arising from the taking by the United
States, whether as a result of treaty of
cession or otherwise, of lands owned or oc-
cupied by claimant without payment for
such lands of compensation agreed to by
the claimant; and (5) claims based on fair
and honorable dealings that are not recog-
nized by any existing rule of law or equity.
The first two clauses admit of easy
interpretation according to ordinary legal
tenets, but clauses three, four, and five
bear special notice as being peculiar to
Indian litigation and without precedent
in American law. In regard to the third
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clause, the Chief of the Indian Claims
Section of the Department of Justice
has noted:
Treaties between the United States and for-
eign nations have been freely construed by
our courts, but never before has any court
had any jurisdiction to &dquo;revise&dquo; a treaty.
This has always been considered a politi-
cal matter completely outside the scope of
judicial inquiry. And technically this sepa-
ration of powers has been preserved for
you will notice that the Commission and
the courts are not given authority to actu-
ally revise the treaty but only to grant re-
lief &dquo;as if&dquo; the treaty were revised.9
Clause four was the subject of much
legal debate until it was finally settled
that the Indian Claims Commission has
jurisdiction over claims based on &dquo;In-
dian title,&dquo; that is, title derived from
the simple use and occupancy of a given
land. The Department of Justice made
strenuous but unsuccessful efforts to
eliminate such aboriginal title claims
from the Indian Claims Commission Act
when the Act was under consideration
for amendment to extend its tenure for
five years beyond 1957. The question
was settled on the outcome of two im-
portant cases which will be discussed.
However, the historical circumstances
underlying the legal reasoning in these
cases must be reviewed.
The terms &dquo;time immemorial&dquo; and
&dquo;Indian title&dquo; figure so prominently in
discussions of Indian claims that it is
surprising to note that neither phrase
occurs anywhere in the Indian Claims
Commission Act. Nor do the terms im-
ply, as is often erroneously assumed,
that Indian tribes must establish their
claims as aboriginal holdings since &dquo;time
immemorial.&dquo; However, the theory of
immemorial possession is fundamental
to Indian claims to land in general since
the United States’ dealings with the In-
dians rested on precedents established
by earlier governments such as those of
France and England; and these govern-
ments recognized Indians as the original
occupants of the American continent.
France entered into various agreements
with different tribes whereby French
sovereignty was extended over Indian
country, but it was understood that the
Indians would remain in possession of
the soil and retain its use as was their
customary wont. England, being more
interested in actual colonization, de-
clared that land acquired from Indians
should be paid for, although English
sovereignty was already established in
a territory as a replacement of Indian
sovereignty or that of another European
nation. The crown also reserved the
right to enter into such purchases and
denied private citizens the authority to
buy land directly from the Indians.10
UNITED STATES TREATIES WITH
INDIANS
The United States followed this rea-
soning in entering into treaties with In-
dians as if they were foreign nations.
The Treaty of Greenville in 1795 is an
outstanding early example in this con-
nection, since the Indians had been
soundly defeated and United States
sovereignty extended over the Ohio Val-
ley on the basis of conquest. Neverthe-
10 "Important Western State Papers," Col-
lections of the State Historical Society of Wis-
consin, Vol. 11 (1888), pp. 26-63, reprints an
interesting series of rare documents and cites
others illustrating this sequence of French,
English, and American philosophies of sover-
eignty in regard to the Old Northwest. In
this connection, Section 12 of the Trade and
Intercourse Act of 1802 (2 Stat. 139) also
enunciates the doctrine that land negotiations
with Indians must be made pursuant to the
Constitution and are not the province of pri-
vate citizens. 
9 Ralph Barney, "Legal Problems Peculiar
to Indian Claims Litigation," Ethnohistory,
Vol. 2, No. 4 (1955), p. 316. The total ar-
ticle, pp. 315-25, notes, among other matters,
further instances in the difficulties of designat-
ing the petitioner Indians.
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less, the tribes concerned were paid for
the cession of territory east of the line
designated in the treaty to separate
white settlement from Indian lands.&dquo;
However, in some instances land was
simply appropriated by white settlers
and the Indians dispersed without com-
pensation before treaties- could be ne-
gotiated. In other cases, Indians re-
mained on certain land which was later
secured to them by Acts of Congress or
Executive Orders of the President. Fi-
nally, some lands were held under In-
dian title, that is, without special recog-
nition and often for long periods of time.
Usually this was done with the under-
standing that some official recognition
would eventually be made. In the last
category was the case of the Tee-Hit-
Ton Indians of Alaska which raised
many questions and a good deal of
consternation among Indians’ lawyers in
terms of possible relationships to claims
before the Commission. In 1951 these
Indians filed a claim before the Court
of Claims for compensation for timber
taken by the United States. Recovery
was not allowed, and the case was
brought before the Supreme Court which
affirmed the negative decision of the
Court of Claims.
The majority opinion, written by Mr.
Justice Reed, begins with the observa-
tion that:
This is not a case that is connected with
any phase of the policy of Congress, con-
tinued throughout our history, to extinguish
Indian title through negotiation rather than
by force, and to grant payments from the
public purse to needy descendants of ex-
ploited Indians.
Indian title was then discussed in terms
of sovereignty held over such land by
the United States through conquest. It
was decided that Indian title is merely
the right of occupancy, not property,
and places the government under no
obligation to compensate Indians for
such lands. This type of title is &dquo;un-
recognized&dquo; in comparison to &dquo;recog-
nized title&dquo; deriving from treaties or
Acts of Congress; only recognized title
would be compensable. Since the Tee-
Hit-Ton Indians based their claims on
the Fifth Amendment, the opinion con-
cludes that in affirming the decision of
the Court of Claims, &dquo;it leaves with
Congress, where it belongs, the policy
of Indian gratuities for the termination
of Indian occupancy of Government-
owned land rather than making com-
pensation for its value a rigid constitu-
tional principle.&dquo; It was also stated in
the opinion that Congress has power to
take or use Indian title without com-
pensation, but makes provision for tribes
to recover for wrongs, &dquo;as a matter of
grace, not because of legal liability.&dquo; 12
Taken as whole, the decision might
have implied that all cases of Indian
title would have to be recognized by
Congress before being submitted to ju-
dicial processes. Applied to claims pend-
11 The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, re-
enacted and confirmed in 1789 (1 Stat. 50),
underlay such provisions as are illustrated in
the Treaty of Greenville:
"The utmost good faith shall always be ob-
served towards the Indians ; their lands and
property shall never be taken from them with-
out their consent; and in their property,
rights and liberty they shall never be invaded
or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars
authorized by Congress; but laws founded in
justice and humanity shall, from time to time,
be made, for preventing wrongs being done to
them, and for preserving peace and friendship
with them."
These features were in effect extended to the
Louisiana Territory in 1804 by an Act of Con-
gress (2 Stat. 283).
The status of Indian tribes as nations was
not only implied in the fact that treaties were
negotiated with them but in the opinion of
Chief Justice Marshall in 1823 in Johnson v.
McIntosh, 8 Wheat, U.S. 543.
12 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348
U.S. 272, 273, 282, 291 (1955); the decision
of the Court of Claims is reported in 128
Court of Claims 82 (1954).
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ing before the Indian Claims Commis-
sion, it was questioned whether or not
the decision might lead to exclusion of
all cases of Indian title from the gen-
eral jurisdiction of the Commission. A
test was provided in 1953 when the Otoe
and Missouria case, in which the Com-
mission recognized the government liable
under Indian title, was appealed to the
Court of Claims.’3
The Court of Claims sustained the
decision of the Indian Claims Commis-
sion, 14 and the Supreme Court declined
to review. the case.15 The phrase in
clause four, &dquo;claims ... as the result
of treaty of cession or otherwise ... ,&dquo;
was finally clarified to include Indian
title within the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission. Congress, in passing a general
jurisdictional act, had fulfilled provisions
lacking in the Tee-Hit-Ton case which
had reached the Supreme Court directly
through the Court of Claims. The sigh
of relief of Indian tribes and their at-




The final jurisdictional clause con-
cerning &dquo;fair and honorable dealings&dquo;
has been the subject of much debate
and has never been settled in the man-
ner of Indian title. The government
has argued consistently that it means
moral claims and is not intended as an
alternative method of securing relief in
the event that a case is not proven un-
der technical legal rules. However, in
one case at least, the disparity between
the price paid a claimant for lands and
the then current market value of the
lands was so great that the Commission-
ers entered a judgment for the difference
on the basis of clause five. They stated
that while there might not have been
sufficient basis for a claim on the grounds
of unconscionable consideration, yet the
evidence did demonstrate a lack of fair
and honorable dealings with the Otoe
and Missouria Indians on the part of
the United States.’6
Despite the broad jurisdictional pro-
visions, especially in clause five, Indians’
attorneys have found it expedient to
base claims for restitution on tangible
and measurable considerations. As a
result, the majority of claims have cen-
tered in land to such an extent that the
Commission is understandably, albeit
erroneously, referred to as the &dquo;Indian
Land Claims Commission.&dquo; Although
our courts have granted judgments for
&dquo;mental anguish’’ and similar grounds,
these have been individual claims and
have thus apparently influenced the
thinking of the Commissioners. One of
the first claims decided by the Commis-
sion was that of the survivors of Ge-
ronimo’s band of Apaches for unfair
imprisonment, and it was dismissed as
being based on individual claims whereas
the jurisdiction of the Commission ex-
tends only to group or tribal claiMS.17
Nevertheless, within the framework of
claims for land, the provisions of the
Act allow inclusion of evidence which is
peculiarly Indian in nature. As has
been noted, the matter of treaty and
nontreaty cases was finally settled, but
further discussion is in order. Osten-
sibly, where the government outlined
Indian holdings in treaties, the land in
question would be more easily defined
and accepted in any claim based on such
treaty. Where no treaty was made, oc-
cupancy and use would have to be de-
termined by historical and anthropologi-
cal evidence. Actually, it is necessary
to establish such use and occupancy
whether or not boundaries were defined
16 Otoe and Missouria Tribe v. United States,
2 Indian Claims Commission, 335, 365 (1953).
17 Fort Sill Apaches v. United States, 1 In-
dian Claims Commission 137 (1949).
13 2 Indian Claims Commission 335.
14 131 Court of Claims 593.
15 350 U.S. 848.
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by treaty. According to clause three, it
is noted that claims may arise out of
negotiations in which fraud, duress, and
mutual or unilateral mistake may have
played a part. When it is recalled that
in many instances treaties were dis-
cussed through interpreters involving
several Indian languages and perhaps
French or Spanish, the possibility of
misrepresentation or misunderstanding
is apparent. Furtheimore, Indian par-
ties to given treaties were usually non-
literate and dependent on their unlet-
teted interpreters for understanding of
the document they signed with an X.
Both from the point of view of the De-
partment of Justice and from that of
the Indians’ attorneys, it is desirable to
review the circumstances regarding a
claim at the time it originated.
It is in this respect that anthropologi-
cal testimony has come into particular
use and is the basis of some disagree-
ment among various scholars. Indian
tribes differed in their concepts of ter-
ritory. Some groups have reliably clear-
cut ideas about boundaries while others
know only their customary habits which
the ethnologist must collate and locate
in terms of mapping village areas, hunt-
ing grounds, and the like. Concern over
the problems of use and occupancy have
resulted in several major discussions at
professional gatherings of anthropolo-
gists wherein the points at issue have at
least been clarified if not settled to
everyone’s satisfaction.&dquo;’
TRIBAL BOUNDARIES
It is naturally to the interests of the
Indians to claim as large an area as pos-
sible, whereas the Department of Jus-
tice is concerned with reducing or elimi-
nating claims on the basis of evidence
presented. Americanists have tradition-
ally mapped tribal boundaries in terms
of contiguous territories, and this con-
cept has been generally accepted by In-
dians’ attorneys with modifications of
details of given lines suggested by more
intensive study of specific tribes. The
Department of Justice has questioned
this approach insofar as different parts
of a tribe’s territory may have been
used more intensively than others. This
has given rise to a theory of land use
and occupancy based on &dquo;nuclear areas&dquo;
surrounded by vacuums of relatively
little used and scarcely occupied land.
A claim might be reduced significantly
by this interpretation. As far as an-
thropologists are concerned, the question
remains open whether the traditional
techniques of tribal mapping are sim-
ply an established convention convenient
for academic purposes, or whether such
maps reflect the empirical conclusions of
many independent researchers in regard
to the proper designation of territori-
ality of human groups generally consid-
ered. This reassessment of tribal map-
ping suggests that neither system can
be taken as THE theory of Indian use
and occupancy, but that each case must
be discussed in terms of the facts avail-
able.&dquo;
18 Cf. "Anthropology and Indian Claims
Litigation: Papers Presented at A Symposium
Held at Detroit, in December, 1954" [Annual
Meeting of the American Anthropological As-
sociation], Ethnohistory, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1955),
pp. 287-375; Robert A. Manners, "The Land
Claims Cases: Anthropologists in Conflict,"
Ethnohistory, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1956), pp. 72-
81; and Nancy Oestreich Lurie, "A Reply to
’The Land Claims Cases: Anthropologists in
Conflict,’" Ethnohistory, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1956),
pp. 256-79. Discussion of Indian claims held
at the Central States Meeting of the American
Anthropological Society held at Bloomington,
Indiana, in May 1955, as a follow-up of the
Detroit Symposium is noted in the last two
papers cited above.
19 Cf. Verne F. Ray, [a review of] Harold
E. Driver, et al., "Indian Tribes of North
America" (Indiana University Publications in
Anthropology and Linguistics: Memoir 9, In-
ternational Journal of Linguistics, Vol. 19, No.
3, Supplement, Baltimore, 1953), in American
Anthropologist, Vol. 57, No. 1, Part I, Feb-
ruary 1955, pp. 145-46; and Harold E. Driver
67
The Department of Justice has tended
to emphasize intensive economic utiliza-
tion of land as the basis of use and oc-
cupancy, whereas attorneys for Indians
have included in evidence both expert
testimony and documentary information
regarding seasonal and noneconomic fac-
tors. Game and plant life, it is argued,
had to be allowed to multiply to assure
a regular supply of food. Thus, given
areas might be intensively used only
for brief seasons. Or, certain areas of
limited economic activities might have
tremendous social significance for a
group so that the loss of a particular
tract of land worked a real hardship in
the established life of the people. Thus,
the gathering of certain plant foods such
as berries in the Plateau area might not
have meant economic necessity, but did
represent an important seasonal activity
which helped underscore an identifying
characteristic of tribes in the area. It
was also pointed out that in the Plateau
given lands were prized simply because
they were isolated and not intensively
used, except in connection with the vi-
sion quest. For a group to exist in its
customary manner, it was necessary for
men to seek visions which required
lonely retreats. Many tribes had areas
that were considered dangerous or sacred
and were thus seldom visited. These
areas, however, held an important value
in the ethos of such groups and caused
a sense of loss in their desecration by
white occupancy or by removal of the
Indians from a familiar terrain.
Whether an interpretation of &dquo;bread
alone&dquo; is to be made, or whether the
broad jurisdictional provisions allowing
of extraordinary claims will be inter-
preted to include loss in a total way of
life, as real as the loss of the land, re-
mains the province of the Commission-
ers. However, a certain selectivity of
data in this regard is inevitable depend-
ing on which attorneys propound ques-
tions put to expert witnesses.
Various precedents have been adduced
to insist that a claim must be based on
exclusive use and occupancy by a par-
ticular tribe.10 Generally, this would
seem a reasonable demand. Temporary
claims to disputed territories would lead
to endless litigation, and, after all, the
suits are brought against the United
States, not between tribes. However,
this circumstance has made attorneys
reluctant to press any claims regarding
shared lands. It is common knowledge
among anthropologists that certain lands
were known as neutral grounds, such as
the immediate vicinity of given natural
resources, or were areas reserved for in-
tertribal games. Two or more tribes
could conceivably hold an equity in
such lands and derive a significant part
of their sustenance or social identity
thetefrom. In other instances, the rec-
ognized owners of a given area per-
mitted neighbors to visit and share in
the local resources, as occurred in the
Celilo fisheries on the Columbia River.
Sometimes, an apparent case of mutual
land use cannot be taken at face value.
The influence of such leaders as Te-
cumseh led to statements by Indians in
treaty negotiations which are master-
pieces of vagueness about tribal bounda-
ries and an embarrassment to the speak-
ers’ descendants. The seeming obtuse-
ness concerning boundaries or specific
tribal areas was a ploy designed to
hamper discussions that might lead to
land cessions.21
20 See United States ex rel Walapai Tribe v.
Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company, 314 U.S.
339.
21 This is admittedly an interpretation with
which the Commissioners may choose to dis-
agree, but it has the virtue of being an inde-
pendent conclusion reached by at least one
other ethnologist who has reviewed the data
on various tribes in the Great Lakes region&mdash;
personal communication of Anthony C. Wal-
[a reply to Verne F. Ray] in American An-
thropologist, Vol. 58, No. 1, February 1956,
pp. 184-85.
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The astonishing complications possible
in regard to the location of given tribes
are well illustrated in the case of the
loway, Sac and Fox, and Omaha,
Docket 138. On August 19, 1825, these
tribes along with some Sioux and Otoes
signed a treaty at Prairie du Chien
whereby a designated area in northern
Missouri and western Iowa, known as
the &dquo;Trust Lands,&dquo; was secured by the
Ioway, Sac and Fox, and Omaha. It
was understood that at some future date
the government would enter into an-
other treaty establishing lines between
the tribes. Such a treaty was never ef-.
fected, and the petitioner Indians claim
that they were misinformed concerning
the next treaty signed at Prairie du
Chien on July 15, 1830. This was con-
strued by the government as a treaty of
cession, whereas the Indians believed
that if they relinquished their common
right to the land, the government would
then designate the specific tribal areas
within the &dquo;Trust Lands.&dquo; Meanwhile,
in the intervening five years, the three
tribes began to work out their own areas
of use and occupancy.
Documentary evidence was presented
showing that the Indians divided lands
in practice and did not wander over
them haphazardly. The Indians’ wit-
ness blocked out the tribal lands as had
been done frequently in nontreaty cases.
Thus, it was with some surprise that the
expert found the propriety of his action
challenged by the defense. The curious
upshot was that other experts were then
called in to testify to the good faith,
scholarly conventionality, and academic
correctness of the first expert’s opinion.
INDIAN CLAIMS
The question of tribal replacements in
given territories during historic times is
exceedingly complex in such areas as
the Ohio Vallev-Great Lakes region. A
shift in locations was set in motion by
the Iroquois wars of the seventeenth
century, and further disturbance was
produced when England and the United
States contested for ownership of the
country. This situation prompted the
Department of Justice to finance a cen-
ter for ethnohistorical study at Indiana
University to do research in approxi-
mately 100 claims in the Great Lakes
region. 22 Just how long a tribe had to
be using and occupying an area exclu-
sively before it was lost to the United
States has never been determined pre-
cisely in making claims for restitution.
Generally, however, the Commissioners
have been interested in materials relat-
ing specifically to the time of origin of
a claim rather than to the prehistoric
past.
After a tribe has actually proven a
case of use and occupancy, a second
phase of historical analysis comes into
play. The actual value of the land must
be determined, and gratuities granted a
tribe in the past must be assessed for
possible offsets against the eventual judg-
ment. A certain reluctance on the part
of Indians’ attorneys to discuss Indian
claims in the public prints reflects anx-
iety over’ the possible size of the still
undetermined figure of the total amount
of Indian claims. It is believed that
what public sympathy might be aroused
in the interests of the Indians would be
more than offset by the average tax-
payer’s fears about the drain on the
public purse. These fears seem some-
what groundless on the basis of figures
available through January 5, 1956. Of
the 102 claims decided by the Commis-
sion by that date, the Indians have been
allowed recovery in 21 cases. The
amount of money has been reduced
from at least $890,000,000 claimed to
lace, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,
Pa.
22 See Bulletin of the American Anthropo-
logical Association, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1954), p.
17 for announcement and description of the
Center.
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$13,283,477.25 awarded. 28 This is a
percentage of awards to claims of 1.5
per cent.
It should be noted that the early
cases tended to be reduced to a strik-
ing degree since the size of claims was
necessarily estimated somewhat provi-
sionally. It was uncertain at the out-
set what sort of legal theory ought to
underlie the attorneys’ preparations, and
thus, in some instances, a practice com-
mon in other types of claims was uti-
lized. That is, an excessive amount was
set forth with the tacit understanding
that the attorneys for the petitioners
and for the defense would engage in a
sort of legal haggling and reduce it to
about what the Indians’ attorneys had
hoped to obtain in the first place. As
more anthropologists took part in these
cases and became more sophisticated in
the operations of the law, they realized
that they could exercise some control
over phases of the cases that antedated
the period in which their services were
requested. Consequently, where a wit-
ness feels that a petition does not con-
form to the facts as he knows them, the
petition can be amended to form an ac-
curate statement of the claim on the
basis of available data. In other in-
stances, claims may be enlarged as
anthropological evidence indicates the
propriety of such a course.
NUMBER OF CA$ES
It may be noted that many of the
illustrations used in this article are
merely reflections of the problems raised
and the types of evidence used in In-
dian claims without reference to the
final determination of the cases. This
circumstance is related to the huge num-
ber of claims filed, approximately 852,
and the necessarily slow process of deal-
ing with them. Since so many cases are
still pending, it is rather early to at-
tempt any sort of general assessment
of the Indian Claims Commission Act.
Nevertheless, certain trends may be
noted. First, these claims will simply
not be settled when the Commission ex-
pires in 1962, even though all of the
cases may be heard and adjudicated by
the Commission. Cases can be, and gen-
erally are, appealed to the United States
Court of Claims by either party. They
can then be taken to the Supreme Court,
or at least a petition may be filed for
that Court to hear them. Thus far, the
Supreme Court has declined to hear any
such appeals. However, the frequent
application to the Court of Claims alone
offers a certain reasonable basis for the
somewhat jocular estimates expressed by
anthropologists that they look forward
to twenty-five years of employment in
Indian claims.
While the amount awarded may not
come close to the amount claimed in
Indian cases, there remains the possi-
bility that some tribes will be put in
possession of large amounts of money.
No definite arrangements have been
made for this eventuality, although care-
fully planned economic and social pro-
grams have been developed by tribes
which have been awarded judgments in
the past, such as the Menominees and
the Ute. Concern has been expressed
by both Indians and interested white
people that the result may be similar to
the unfortunate experiences of the fa-
mous &dquo;oil Indians.&dquo; Even where awards
are small, they might have enduring
value if invested for tribal benefits
rather than simply divided among the
individual members of the group. How-
ever, the Indians are understandably
concerned with personal payments, as-
sociating the management of their re-
23 These figures are based on a compilation
made by the Commission. Of the total of
102 claims decided, only 78 claimed specific
amounts giving the total of $890,000,000. No
definite amount was claimed in the rest of the
cases, but the Commission has advised that the
amount claimed, as estimated, was between
$1,000,000,000 and $1,200,000,000.
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sources with part of their general griev-
ances against the government.
The chances are that even the tribes
that actually win awards will not be
completely satisfied. As far as some
tribes are concerned, the idea that the
Commission would settle Indian griev-
ances once and for all has already fallen
short of its goal. Although an occa-
sional Indian will recognize an unfortu-
nate and sometimes unwarranted tend-
ency to self-pity on the part of his
fellows, lost claims or unregulated re-
coveries may contribute further com-
plications and grievances despite the
benevolent intent of the Indian Claims
Commission Act. It is useless, how-
ever, to argue that the Act should have
never been put into effect. Obviously,
the same process would take place, and
with less satisfactory techniques and re-
sults, by the earlier means of Acts of
Congress and recourse to the Court of
Claims. Although the Indian Claims
Commission Act contains revolutionary
provisions in the light of American legal
history, it remains a legal instrument
and must be assessed as such. It can-
not be expected to work as a cure-all
for Indian complaints of a socio-his-
torical nature involving intangible fac-
tors beyond any possible legal inter-
pretation.
Through the provisions of the Act it-
self, Indians were informed by their su-
perintendents of the existence of the
Commission and of their right to bring
claims. This educational function might
be extended to prepare programs for
those Indians likely to receive awards.
Where recoveries may be small or noth-
ing will likely be gained from a claim,
Indians should be informed of what the
Act can do and cannot do, and why
this is the case. Anyone familiar with
Indians knows that these are not easy
tasks to carry out since it was the gen-
eralized sense of Indian discontent itself
that led to efforts to satisfy claims as a
means of furthering effective adminis-
tration of Indian affairs. Nevertheless,
the cases are being settled slowly, and
with the increasing economic sophistica-
tion of at least the younger Indians,
there is yet time to develop policies to
further implement the fundamental phi-
losophy of the Indian Claims Commis-
sion Act.
